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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
FURTHER ON APPEALS BY THE STATE
IN CRIMINAL CASES
State v. Rosen'
Charles Rosen and others were indicted for selling bets
on horse races and Meyer Seidel and another were indicted
for conducting a lottery. The cases were consolidated and
the defendants elected to be tried together before the court
without a jury. Later a search and seizure warrant was
applied for against all of the parties, and a judge of the
Supreme Bench of Baltimore City found probable cause
to exist and ordered the warrant to issue. Trial was com-
menced and one witness was placed upon the stand by the
State. The defendants thereupon moved to quash the
search and seizure warrant, and the court, after holding
the matter sub curia for several days, quashed the warrant
because as found by him it did not show probable cause.
The State thereupon informed the court that they were
powerless to proceed. The parties were found not guilty
and the State appealed.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal upon the
ground that the defendants had once been acquitted and
discharged upon a valid indictment, and therefore no right
existed in the State to take an appeal.
The right of the State to appeal was commented upon
in this REvIEw in a note2 to the case of State v. Mariana.3
In the Mariana case the question of double jeopardy was
never raised and was not commented upon at all by the
Court of Appeals.' The instant case is noted because the
Mariana case was cited by the State as authority for appeal
when the question of double jeopardy was involved.
The State also cited State v. King5 and the line of cases
holding that the State may appeal from an adverse ruling
upon a demurrer to the indictment or when the case is
decided on the pleadings alone.6 The Court of Appeals
distinguished these cases by saying, "The appellee had not
been tried upon the indictment," and said of the Mariana
128 A. (2d) 829 (Md., 1942).
Appeal8 by the State in Criminal Case8 (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 303.
S174 Md. 85, 197 A. 620 (1938).
See op. cit. supra, n. 2, 308.
S124 Md. 491, 92 A. 1041 (1915).
8 State v. Buchanan, et al., 5 H. & J. 317, 500, 9 Am. Dec. 534 (1821);
State v. McNally and Myers, 55 Md. 559 (1880) ; State v. Camper, 91 Md.
672, 47 A. 1027 (1900) : State v. Tag, 100 Md. 588, 60 A. 465 (1905) ; State
v. King, 124 Md. 491, 92 A. 1041 (1915) ; State v. Gregg, 163 Md. 353, 163
A. 119 (1932) ; State v. Scarborough, 55 Md. 345 (1881).
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case, ". . in the latter case, there was no statute or prece-
dent in Maryland approving the practice of suppressing
evidence prior to the trial. 7
In the instant case the State contended that there had
been no trial upon the merits and that the appellees had
not been placed in jeopardy, but the Court held that the
appellees had been placed in jeopardy, stating as follows:
"But this we think is contrary to the fact, because
the record definitely shows that before the court acted
upon the motion to quash the warrant, Lt. Emerson
was placed upon the witness stand by the State, who
examined him and then there was offered the applica-
tion for the warrant and the warrant in evidence. It
would be novel indeed for the State to proceed thus
with the trial of the case with the motion pending, for
the burden was on the appellees and not upon the
State to offer some facts to get rid of the warrant. We
think, therefore, that it cannot be said that appellees
were not in. jeopardy and the appeals must be dis-
missed, because the trial had actually started when
the ruling was made."8
The Court of Appeals thus held that a defendant has
been placed in jeopardy once the trial has started, and a
witness for the State has been placed upon the stand. This
would seem to be in accord with general authority on the
meaning of jeopardy9 and would be in line with earlier
decisions of this Court.10 However, it is unfortunate that
the Court did not make further comment upon the Mariana
case, for if the defendants in the instant case had been
placed in jeopardy and the State was barred from taking
an appeal, it would seem that the defendant in the Mariana
case had also been placed in jeopardy and the State should
have been barred from taking an appeal in that case. The
Court in commenting upon the Mariana case might well
have distinguished it upon the basis that the right of the
728 A. (2d) 829, 830.
'28 A. (2d) 829-830.
It is not the purpose of this note to go into the question of what consti-
tutes jeopardy in Maryland. Some aspects of jeopardy were discussed in a
note to Crawford v. State, 174 Md. 175, 197 A. 866 (1938), Effect of Ac-
quittal for Assault on Trial for Murder When Victim Subsequently Die
(1939) 3 Md. L. Rev. 184.
10 State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301 (1878); Bell v. State, 57 Md. 108, 120
(1881) ; Cochran v. State, 119 Md. 539, 87 A. 400 (1913) ; State v. King, 124
Md. 491, 496. 92 A. 1041, 1043 (1915) ; and Berkenfeld v. State, 104 Md.
253, 65 A. 1 (1906).
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appellee in that case to have the appeal dismissed had
never been raised by the appellee, and the Court was not
required to raise it upon its own motion. Unless some
comment is made by the Court of Appeals upon the Mari-
ana case it may well be seized upon by the State as it was
in the instant case as authority for allowing the State to
take an appeal after a verdict of not guilty has been
entered.
The Court dismisses the Mariana case from considera-
tion by stating that there was no statute or precedent in
Maryland approving the lower court's action in suppress-
ing evidence before trial, but in the Mariana case the State
went to trial, which trial resulted in a verdict for the de-
fendant and there seems to be very little doubt in view of
the Court's decision in the instant case and of its prior
decisions that it would have held the defendant had been
placed in jeopardy in the Mariana case if the question had
been presented. To remove the doubt and uncertainty
created by the Mariana case the Court should have used
the best basis for saying that it was not authority for per-
mitting an appeal by the State; namely, that a case is only
authority under the doctrine of stare decisis for what it
specifically decides, and is not authority for any question
which is snot presented.
If appeal by the State is to be allowed whenever there
is no statute or precedent in Maryland approving the
lower court's action, then the State could appeal in any
criminal case in which the lower court misinterpreted the
law. There is also no statute or precedent allowing a nisi
prius court to grant a motion for a directed verdict in crim-
inal cases and if this should be done in some future case
the State might well appeal, citing the Mariana case again
as authority.".
The Court's decision will be met with general approval,
and it can be taken as established Maryland law on the
basis of this decision that once the defendant has been
placed in jeopardy and been acquitted and discharged upon
a valid indictment, the State has no right to appeal. It is
11 See, for a discussion of this point, op. cit. supra, n. 2, 310-311, wherein
speculation is indulged concerning whether the State could appeal if a trial
court granted a motion for directed verdict of not guilty in a criminal case
in Maryland. A further query could be here stated. Suppose a trial court
grants defendant's motion for directed verdict and the State does not
attempt to appeal, but, rather, later attempts to re-try defendant on the
same indictment. May defendant plead jeopardy, or will the action in
the first trial be regarded as amounting merely to a mistrial, in view of
the fact that Maryland law does not recognize the existence of a directed
verdict of not guilty in a criminal case?
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only unfortunate that the question of double jeopardy was
not more thoroughly discussed in the opinion. It would
seem that the Mariana case will probably fall within the
class of cases including those of State v. Williams,12 and
State v. Sutton13 which, while not endangering the rights
of defendants in criminal cases, still leave the law in a
state of sufficient doubt that the defendant in some future
case may again be forced to defend an appeal taken by
the State.
Book Review
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ITS GROWTH, PROCEDURE AND SIG-
NIFICANCE. By Roscoe Pound. Pittsburgh. The University
of Pittsburgh Press, 1942. Pp. x, 138.
Professor Pound distills the legal philosophy and his-
tory of centuries as easily as advocates marshal the evi-
dence of a current case. This book focuses the significance
of administrative law against a background which includes
the works of continental jurists, the struggle for the inde-
pendence of courts in England and Colonial America, the
case law of judicial review, and the social and economic
reasons underlying the growth and procedure of the ad-
ministrative process. Professor Pound recognizes the need
of administrative law "and of a great deal of it, in the
urban industrial society of today." It is needed, he affirms,
as an administrative element in and as a supplement to
the judicial process. "It is needed as a directing process
in a society so organized economically and so unified eco-
nomically that things must be done more speedily, with
more adjustment to unique situations, with more co-ordina-
tion of special skill and technical acquirements than the
judicial process, looking at controversies after the event,
can afford." The fact that he is not attacking administra-
tion as a means of government nor deploring the rise of
administrative justice gives added weight to his warning
125 Md. 82 (1853).
"4 Gill 494 (Md., 1846).
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